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Mortgages. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Business
Loan Fund, Inc., 200 A.3d 153 (R.I. 2019). Pursuant to Rhode
Island General Laws section 34-26-7, a mortgage will become void
after “thirty-five (35) years from the date of the recording of the
mortgage, or in the case of a mortgage in which the term or
maturity date is stated, five (5) years from the expiration of the
term or maturity date.” 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On June 2, 1992, Norris Waldron (Waldron) granted a
mortgage to Providence Business Loan Fund (Defendant) “as
security for a loan in the amount of $70,660” with a stated term of
ten years.2 The mortgage was recorded in the Providence land
evidence records on June 3, 1992, without a maturity date. 3 Four
years later, on December 20, 1996, Waldron and Defendant
“entered into a ‘Modification Agreement’” which reduced the
amount owed to $44,016.75, “to be repaid over a period of 108
months, beginning on January 1, 1997.”4 This modification
agreement was never recorded in the Providence land evidence
records, but the two parties created an amendment to the original
1992 mortgage, which specified the reduction in the amount of debt
owed.5 The newly amended 1992 mortgage, however, “failed to
reflect the 108-month term listed in the modification agreement
and it did not specify any other term or maturity date.” 6
On January 23, 2004, “Waldron conveyed the property to
Jocelyn Waldron by quitclaim deed,” 7 and years later, on October
1. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Providence Bus. Loan Fund, Inc., 200
A.3d 153, 157 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 155.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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29, 2014, Jocelyn conveyed the property to Broad Street, LLC by
warranty deed.8 It was not until February 8, 2017, that “defendant
gave notice to Broad Street LLC of its commencement of foreclosure
proceedings on the 1992 mortgage.” 9 Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC
(Plaintiff), a lienholder on the property, filed a complaint in
Superior Court on March 6, 2017, “seeking a declaration that
defendant’s mortgage had been discharged under [Rhode Island
General Laws] § 34-26-7 . . . and that, therefore, defendant had no
right to foreclose on the property.” 10
On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the original mortgage had expired pursuant
to section 34-26-7, and that even if the amendment filed in 1997
“had properly extended the mortgage,” the Defendant would still be
barred from foreclosing the property.11 The Defendant countered
that since the original mortgage did not include a maturity date,
that automatically created a “thirty-five-year lien,” as stated in the
statute.12 The Defendant argued in the alternative that because
the amendment, which was recorded in the Providence land
evidence records, did not include a term or maturity date, this
meant the amendment extended the expiration period to thirty-five
years from January 1, 1997. 13
The hearing justice ultimately “found the 1997 amendment to
be a ‘non-compliant mortgage extension, which is ineffective under
the statute.’” 14 She also found the 1992 mortgage to be the
operative document, and as such, the Defendant’s mortgage had
expired because the 1992 mortgage stated a term of ten years.15
The hearing justice, upon analyzing the “plain and ordinary
meaning” of the statute, concluded that, since the mortgage
contained an express term, the statute allowed for “exercise of the
power of sale only five years following that term.” 16 Further,
because the term ended in 2002, the mortgage had expired in
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 156.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2007.17 Accordingly, the hearing justice granted the Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment. 18 The Defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal. 19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court) reviewed the
hearing justice’s grant of the motion for summary judgment de
novo. 20 The Court stated it would only affirm the trial court’s
decision if it concluded that “no genuine issue of material fact exists
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” 21 The Defendant “b[ore] the burden of proving by competent
evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material fact.” 22
During the hearing, the Defendant contended that “the hearing
justice erred in granting [the] motion for summary judgment”
because there was an issue of material fact over “whether the 1992
mortgage ha[d] expired.” 23 Defendant argued that “the 1997
amendment [was] the only proper instrument to determine the
validity of the 1992 mortgage.” 24 Specifically, Defendant asserted
that because the amendment was executed before the 1992
mortgage expired, it “created an extension of thirty-five (35)
years.” 25 Additionally, the Defendant argued that “at a minimum
the mortgage [was] valid for thirty-five years from June 3, 1992.” 26
Conversely, the Plaintiff “maintain[ed] that the 1992 mortgage
ha[d] expired under the statute,” and that the 1997 amendment,
even if valid, “would not extend the original mortgage.” 27
In deciding whether the 1992 mortgage ran for thirty-five
years, the Court looked to the language of section 34-26-7 and
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. (quoting Pineda v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 186 A.3d 1054, 1056
(R.I. 2018)).
21. Id. (quoting Cancel v. City of Providence, 187 A.3d 347, 350 (R.I.
2018)).
22. Id. (quoting Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pac. LLC, 140 A.3d 100, 103
(R.I. 2016)).
23. Id. at 157.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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stated that it “give[s] the words their plan and ordinary meaning”
when the language is “clear and unambiguous.”28 It continued that
it has held that “the words ‘or’ and ‘and’ are not the equivalent of
each other and should not be considered as interchangeable unless
reasonably necessary in order to give effect to the intention of the
enacting body.” 29 The Court applied that principle when reviewing
section 34-26-7, specifically the provision stating
that foreclosure proceedings may not be brought “after the
expiration of a period which shall be thirty-five (35) years
from the date of recording of the mortgage, or in the case of
a mortgage in which the term or maturity date is stated,
five (5) years from the expiration of the term of the
maturity date.” 30
The Court held that, in light of the plain language of the statute,
“the 1992 mortgage ran for the ten-year term, plus five years
following expiration of that term.” 31
Lastly, the Court addressed the 1997 amendment and its
consequences. The Court again looked to section 34-26-7, which
provides “[t]he period [in which a power of sale may be exercised]
shall not be extended by nonresidence nor disability of any person
interested in the mortgage or the real estate, or by any partial
payment, agreement, extension, acknowledgment, affidavit or
other action not meeting the requirements.” 32 It was clear to the
Court that any change to the original mortgage was required to “be
indexed in the land evidence records under the name of the present
landowner.” 33 Since the amendment did not list the 108-month
term, it failed to extend the term of the 1992 mortgage. 34 Though
the language of the amendment clearly indicated that the parties
intended to amend the 1992 mortgage to include the amount owed,
it did not affect the mortgage in any other way. 35

28. Id. (quoting Rein v. ESS Grp., Inc., 184 A.3d 695, 702 (R.I. 2018)).
29. Id. at 158 (quoting Earle v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Warwick, 191 A.2d
161, 164 (R.I. 1963)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-26-7).
34. Id. at 155, 158.
35. Id. at 159.
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COMMENTARY
The Court properly found that the Defendant did not meet the
requirements of section 34-26-7 in order to extend the 1992
mortgage, and thus the mortgage expired in 2007. 36 The Court’s
reasoning in upholding the judgment of the hearing justice was
sound because after giving the words of the statute their plain and
ordinary meaning, there was no genuine dispute of material facts
in the case at bar. 37
However, one could argue that based upon the clear language
of the modification to the mortgage, the parties’ failure to include a
specific date could have been intentional. 38 If the Court had taken
this perspective, the portion of the modification which states, “has
been modified . . . by agreement of even date herewith, to modify
the terms and to extend the maturity date,” coupled with the
absence of a specific date, could have modified the previous
mortgage to rid it of its specified term.39 Under this view, the
Defendant would have been correct that the mortgage was still
valid under section 34-26-7, and that the mortgage would have been
extended thirty-five years from the January 1, 1997 modification. 40
While such an interpretation of the modification may be plausible,
it nevertheless does not coincide with general standards of contract
interpretation. As such, the Defendant failed to prove “by
competent evidence the existence of a disputed issue of material
fact.” 41
CONCLUSION
The Court held that pursuant to section 34-26-7, the mortgage
granted to the Defendant expired on June 3, 2007, and that
“summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff was appropriate.” 42
The Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 43
Ethan M. Armitano
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 157.
See id. at 155.
Id.
Id. at 155, 157.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 159.

